



Development and Gender Perspective: An Anthropological Approach

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Abstract: Feminism is made up of several diverse social theories, political movements, and philosophies. Most of these adopt a critical stance toward the existing social relations, especially gendered relations. Feminist theory looks at the origins, characteristics, and forms of gender inequality in order to focus on gender politics, power relations, and sexuality. Feminism is consciously political and activist. Its politics centers on immediate issues like reproductive rights, domestic violence, maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, discrimination, and sexual violence as well as such long-term issues as patriarchy, stereotyping, objectification, and oppression. Themes related to development include the inequality between genders, the disproportionate amount of work performed by women, and yet the absence of women in development policy or group decision making in general, all of this being attributed to the subordination of women. As feminism developed, this universalism came to be seen as oppressive in the sense that women from different backgrounds did not share the same experiences. In this regard especially, modern feminist theory was criticized as being predominantly associated with the views of Western middle-class academia rather than emanating from Third World intellectuals and activists.

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I. DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES AND FEMINISM

Feminism is made up of several diverse social theories, political movements, and philosophies. Most of these adopt a critical stance toward the existing social relations, especially gendered relations. Feminist theory looks at the origins, characteristics, and forms of gender inequality in order to focus on gender politics, power relations, and sexuality. Feminism is consciously political and activist. Its politics centers on immediate issues like reproductive rights, domestic violence, maternity leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, discrimination, and sexual violence as well as such long-term issues as patriarchy, stereotyping, objectification, and oppression. Themes related to development include the inequality between genders, the disproportionate amount of work performed by women, and yet the absence of women in development policy or group decision making in general, all of this being attributed to the subordination

of women. In its early response, feminist political activism tried to create grassroots movements that crossed boundaries and brought together women of differing classes, races, cultures, religions, and regional backgrounds as a group suffering common forms of oppression. As feminism developed, this universalism came to be seen as oppressive in the sense that women from different backgrounds did not share the same experiences. In this regard especially, modern feminist theory was criticized as being predominantly associated with the views of Western middle-class academia rather than emanating from Third World intellectuals and activists. Increased emphasis was placed on differences, contradictions, and strategy rather than a unifying politics. We now have diverse feminist causes rather than a unified feminist movement. Feminist activism and politics began as an organized movement in the latter half of the 19th century. Its first wave focused on equal contract rights and property rights for women and opposition to the ownership of married women (and their children) by their husbands. By the end of the 19th century, feminist activism concentrated primarily on gaining political power, particularly the inclusion of women in suffrage (voting rights). It was not until 1918–1928 that women finally gained the right to vote in Britain and the United States, showing the genderbiased nature of modern political democracy. The second wave of feminist activism and theory, beginning during the early 1960s and lasting through the late 1980s, expanded the feminist critique to capitalism as biased, discriminatory, and unfair. In the United States, second-wave feminism emerged from the civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements when women, disillusioned with their second-class status even in activist student politics, began collectively to contend against discrimination.

In a key book at the time, *The Feminine Mystique*, Betty Friedan (1963) observed that women were compelled to find meaning in their lives chiefly through their husbands and children, inclining them to lose their identity in that of their family. Friedan was instrumental in forming the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, part of a broader social movement coalescing under the banner of “Women’s Liberation.” Second-wave feminists engaged in several kinds of activism, ranging from a protest against the Miss America beauty contest in 1968 to setting up consciousness-raising groups. However, differences emerged among black feminists, lesbian feminists, liberal feminists, and socialist feminists, with bell hooks, an African American feminist intellectual, arguing that the movement lacked minority voices and failed to address “the issues that divide women.” The third wave of the 1990s is associated with the entry of post structural and postmodern ideas into what had become a far more differentiated feminism. Third-wave feminism problematizes the second wave’s “essentialist” definitions of femininity that often assumed a universal female identity and overemphasized the experiences of upper-middle-class white women. Third-wave theory places more emphasis on the fundamental ambiguity inherent in gendered terms and

categories and usually includes queer theory and transgender politics while rejecting gender binaries. It also addresses itself to antiracism and women-of-color consciousness, womanism, postcolonial theory, critical theory, trans nationalism, eco feminism, libertarian feminism, and new feminist theory. Third-wave feminists often prefer micro- to macro politics and include forms of gender expression and representation that are less explicitly political than their predecessors. Some theorists recognize a “post feminist” trend beginning during the early 1990s that suggested that feminism was no longer needed. During the second and third waves, feminists interested in inequality, poverty, and gender relations produced a significant body of critical ideas on development, while issues raised by feminists became important in international agencies dealing with development problems so much so that feminist development theory now forms a recognizable system of concepts, discourses, and practices. This recognition of the position of women in development came not just from the efforts of feminist thinkers but also was brought about by real changes in the position of women in the global production system.

The globalization of economic activity during the last third of the 20th century incorporated millions of women into the labor force. Indeed, women arguably are becoming the majority of the new global working class, pitted against global financial and industrial capital that is male dominated. Global development pushed poor Third World women into jobs that have changed their social and economic status. There has been an increase in the number of poor households headed by women (widowed or abandoned), forcing women to undertake paid work along with their domestic responsibilities that is, to double their total work effort. Women are entering the global labor force in record numbers, and more women work outside the household than ever before: some 1.1 billion of the world’s 2.8 billion workers (40%) are women, representing a worldwide increase of nearly 200 million women in each recent decade. Unfortunately, they face higher unemployment rates and lower wages than men and therefore represent 60% of the world’s 550 million working poor (International Labour Organization 2004). Of the 27 million people working worldwide in export processing zones (EPZs), some 90% are women—they usually make garments, shoes, toys, or electronic parts. Working for wages may increase women’s say in the household and community, and increased communication among workers may open up the possibility for women to negotiate over their working conditions. But the feminization of employment primarily results from employers’ needs for cheaper and more flexible sources of labor. This employment does not necessarily improve the well-being of the worker: it simply creates a double burden of paid and unpaid work, with employment usually occurring under poor-quality conditions. Many companies in EPZs employ young, unskilled, or semiskilled women, provide minimal training, and frequently

move or restructure, leading to recurring unemployment. Women active in workers' movements, various left-wing organizations, and environmental, peace, and human rights movements are critical of this kind of global development. They look for alternatives, sometimes within development and sometimes outside of it. Critics range from those who lobby governance institutions for better economic policies founded on gender equality and social and environmental well-being to those who push for something completely different, as with good health and education, clean water and fuel, child care, and basic nutrition at a reasonable cost for the majority. Many feminists in this more critical vein join the growing resistance to the free trade and liberalization regimes of the Bretton Woods institutions, such as women engaged in the 50 Years Is Enough campaign, End Debt, the World Social Forum, and various NGOs and women's movements (Harcourt and Escobar 2005; Miles 1996). In sum, women are on the development agenda because of their importance as well as their insistence.

Feminist Epistemology To answer the question of the position of women in the development debate, we might first look at some significant arguments in feminist epistemology. ("Epistemology" basically means the theory of knowledge, especially how it is produced and how it is judged to be true or not.) Questions of feminist epistemology, many outlined for the first time during the late 1970s and early 1980s, became central foci of feminist concern by the mid- to late 1980s. Enlightenment notions of reason, progress, science, and emancipation underlie the modern development project as its foundations in modern belief. And as we have seen, the modern belief in scientific rationality came under new criticism during the last third of the 20th century from several directions, one of these being feminism. In *The Man of Reason* Genevieve Lloyd (1984) argued that the modern ideal of rationality, developed during the 17th century by Descartes, Spinoza, and other philosophers, was characterized by maleness, so that when they spoke of "human ideals" they were actually talking about "ideals of manhood." The 17th-century philosopher René Descartes, Lloyd argues, separated clear and distinct thinking (reason), which he attributed to men, from the sensuous and imaginative faculties (emotions) that he attributed to women—that is, men are rational and women emotional. Spinoza thought that emotions, in their original state as passions, were confused perceptions of reality that could be transformed into intellect only through a strong man's detached (distanced, objective) understanding of such grand questions as universality and transhistorical necessity. Then, during the Enlightenment, suggests Lloyd, passion and non rationality were regarded somewhat more positively, as well springs of action. Even so, passion was either to be transcended or transformed through the medium of reason into "higher" (more masculine) rational modes of thought. Nineteenth-century romanticism, Lloyd thought, again revalued the passions but this time put women on a pedestal, leaving the man of reason intact and thus preserving

the modern dichotomy between reason and passion, men as rational and women as emotional. Post structural feminists not only were critical of the Enlightenment notion that all problems could be solved by reason (and men) but also went on to the far more radical idea that many problems actually have their origin in (male) reason. Hence, Lloyd asserted, feminists joined in the post structural critique of reason and its enlightened products, such as modern development. Harding outlined three sets of feminist epistemological attitudes toward science: *feminist empiricism* argued that stricter adherence to existing norms of inquiry by women scientists could correct social biases in science; *feminist standpoint theory*, originating in Hegelian and Marxist thought, argued that men's dominance resulted in partial and perverse understandings whereas women's subjugated position gave them the potential for more complete understanding; and *feminist postmodernism* challenged the universalizing assumptions of the other two positions, emphasizing the fractured identities created by modern life and the multiple nature of theorizing. Harding questioned whether feminists should give up trying to provide *one* true feminist story about reality when confronted by powerful alliances between science and sexist, racist social projects. She concluded that, while feminist epistemological notions had their own problems and contradictory tendencies, feminist criticism had already enhanced the understanding of androcentrism in science (Harding 1986: 29). A particularly interesting variant of feminist standpoint theory was developed by the Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith. Smith (2002) perceived a growing gap between the responsible person she was as a wife and mother and the person she was expected to be as a scholar. Ways of knowing that were relevant at home, as a wife and mother, were not recognized as a legitimate basis for knowing in the intellectual world. Women could also learn to operate in the abstract conceptual (male) mode, but this meant suppressing their experiential knowledge in favor of objectified knowing. Working "ideologically," women scholars contribute to the research that determines how the world gets framed for the people who live in it. How women's experience gets written about and reflected officially in documents differs fundamentally from women's real experiences in home and family. The new official knowledge is then used against women authoritatively, to re-order and manage them. In particular Smith was interested in official documents, or "documentary realities" more broadly, and their part in making authority and power systems: text mediated social organization as the technology of ruling in late 20th-century capitalist societies (Smith 1990a: 209–224). In a knowledge-based society, ruling practices rely on authorized versions of knowledge routinely generated by social scientists, organization theorists, and information management scholars and consultants. People take up these ruling concepts and activate them as they go about their daily lives. Such official knowledge is routinely counted on to make organizations function smoothly. Texts transport power in ideologies and practices

across sites and among people. Text-mediated ruling practices, Smith argued, subordinate local knowing, imposing ruling perspectives. Women's standpoint grounded in everyday experience offers a challenge to these ruling perspectives. "At the line of fault along which women's experience breaks away from the discourses mediated by texts . . . a critical standpoint emerges" (1990a: 11). Smith asserted that women's standpoint, grounded in everyday experiences, was the starting point for a different approach to knowing fully and in a more trustworthy way. Women have the experience of being "out-of-step" in many situations. Knowing differently was the basis for changing the conditions of women's lives. This meant identifying and challenging the otherwise unquestioned, taken for granted, prevailing ways of knowing and acting. When people begin to see how they participate in their own and others' oppression by using the oppressor's language and tools and taking up actions that are not in their own interests, an oppressive work should be advanced (Campbell 2003). Furthering this, Smith (2002) was instrumental in forming an approach called "institutional ethnography" that emphasizes connections among sites and situations in everyday life, professional practice, and policymaking circles. These connections are accomplished primarily through "textually-mediated social organization." Smith developed the approach initially in a feminist context, calling it a method that could produce a sociology *for* (rather than *about*) women, but recognized its wider applications; theorists following Smith have looked at a number of relevant topics, including the organization of healthcare, education, and social work practice, the regulation of sexuality, police and judicial processing of violent acts against women, employment and job training, economic and social restructuring, international development regimes, planning and environmental policy, the organization of home and community life, and various kinds of activism. While the method is ethnographic (using field work to produce detailed descriptions of institutions, ethnic groups, etc.) it is more concerned with political-economic contexts than most qualitative approaches and is sensitive to the textual and discursive dimensions of social life (Devault 1999). Smith's ideas are similar to post structural ideas derived from Foucault, but Smith disagreed with the postmodern position that "denies that categories and concepts can refer to and represent a reality beyond them, indeed, that it is meaningful to speak of a reality which is not in language" (1999: 99). Under the rubric of "cartographies of struggle" Chandra Mohanty (1991a, 1991b) critically examined feminist writings that produced the "Third World woman" as a singular monolithic subject in a process that she called "discursive colonization." By this she meant the appropriation and codification of scholarship and knowledge through analytical categories that took as their primary referent feminist interests articulated in the West. For Mohanty, this discursive colonization suppressed the heterogeneity of Third World subjects. Feminist writers, she said, "discursively colonize the material and historical heterogeneities

of the lives of women in the third world, thereby producing/re-presenting a composite, singular “third world woman”—an image which appears arbitrarily constructed, but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse” (Mohanty 1991b: 53). Much feminist work on women in the Third World, she said, was characterized by assumptions of privilege and ethnocentric universality and was insufficiently self-conscious about the effects of Western scholarship. Analyses based on cross-culturally singular monolithic notions of patriarchy or male dominance led to a similarly reductive notion of Third World differences, a systematization of the oppression of women that she herself found to be exercising oppressive power. Mohanty found disconcerting similarities between such Western feminist positions and the project of Western humanism in general. Only because “woman” and “East” were defined as “peripheral” or “Other” could Western man represent himself as “center” or “Same.” “It is not the center that determines the periphery, but the periphery that, in its boundedness, determines the center” (Mohanty 1991b: 73–74). French post structural feminist theorists such as Julia Kristeva (1980) and Helene Cixous (1981) had deconstructed the latent anthropomorphism in Western discourse; Mohanty suggested a parallel strategy, namely, focusing on a latent ethnocentrism in feminist writing on women in the Third World. Mohanty’s statement, made from a position of feminism’s Other, profoundly disrupted the prevailing mode of feminist discourse that had taken the form of competing political positions within an assumed Western and privileged realm (Western women know how to develop “them”). The notion of a singular progressive women’s movement began to be questioned . . . increasingly and insistently. Then, as the 1980s turned into the 1990s, the full force of the postmodern turn in philosophy and social

theory also began to enter feminist theory. Postmodern feminism found modern reason to be normalizing, Western, masculine prejudice, whose “enlightenment” embodied a scientific rationalism that colonized (and therefore subjugated) alternative ways of thinking. For some, the Enlightenment and feminism had to be opposed to each other in principle. For instance, Jane Flax (1990: 42) contended that feminist theory belonged in the terrain of postmodern philosophy: “Feminist notions of the self, knowledge, and truth are too contradictory to those of the Enlightenment to be contained within its categories. The way(s) to feminist future(s) cannot lie in reviving or appropriating Enlightenment concepts of the person or knowledge.” Thus, some feminist theorists began to sense that the motto of the Enlightenment “have courage to use your own reason” (this from Kant) rested on a gender-rooted sense of self and self-deception. The suspicion arose that all transcendental claims reflected and reified the experience of a few persons, mostly white male Westerners. For others, the matter was not that clear. Other feminist social theorists found greater potential in a critique of Western humanism (Johnson 1994). Christine Di Stefano (1990) argued that

mainstream postmodernist theory (Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault, etc.) had been remarkably insensitive to questions of gender in its rereadings of history, politics, and culture (that is, postmodern theory merely continued the modernist project). Perhaps most importantly, the postmodern project, if seriously adopted by feminists, would make any semblance of a united feminist politics impossible. Thus, many leftist thinkers advocated that feminists should remain skeptical about anti-Enlightenment criticisms: just as women were finally being granted the power of reason, postmodern feminists were undercutting rationality. Luce Irigaray (1985) asked: Was postmodernism the “last ruse” of patriarchy? Nancy Hartsock (1985) noted that, while postmodernism appeared to side with marginal groups, postmodernists ended up hindering them rather than helping them—that is, postmodern theories gave little political guidance at best, and at worst merely recapitulated the effects of Enlightenment theories. Such other feminist theorists as Flax and Di Stefano were ambivalent about the choice between modernism and postmodernism. However, rather than attempting to resolve this ambivalence by favoring one side over the other, Sandra Harding (1990: 86), for example, argued that “ambivalence should be much more robust and principled.” that is, she argued for a self-conscious and theoretically articulated ambivalence derived from the tensions and contradictions in the worlds inhabited by women. Harding herself, however, concluded that feminism stood on Enlightenment ground in its belief that improved theories contributed to social progress. She thought that feminist inquiry could produce less partial theories without asserting their absolute, universal, or eternal adequacy. Thus, in her view, both feminist science theorists and their feminist postmodern critics “stand with one foot in modernity and the other in the lands beyond” (Harding 1990: 100). She thought that feminism needed *both* the Enlightenment and postmodern agendas. Located in such an “in-between position” (between the modern and postmodern), Donna Haraway (1988, 1991) argued for a feminist epistemology of objectivity that she called “situated knowledge.” In this conception, objectivity was concerned with the particular and specific, with embodiment and not false visions of transcendence: “Only partial perspectives promise objective vision. . . . Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway 1991: 190). In other words objectivity is knowledge about what can be precisely known. For Haraway, feminism could theorize the grounds for trusting the vantage points of the subjugated—feminism could see from the peripheries and the depths. The positions of subjugated peoples could not be exempted from criticism, but they were to be *preferred* because they were least likely to deny the critical interpretive core of knowledge. So, the important question, for Haraway, was not *whether* to see from below but *how* to see from below. Such a preferred positioning

she found to be as hostile to relativism as it was to totalization and the modern notion of a single human vision. The alternative was partial, locatable, critical knowledge, sustaining webs of political connections and conversations in epistemology (situated knowledge), whereas relativism was being nowhere and yet claiming to be everywhere (a “god-trick”). Beginning with Descartes and the separation between clear and distinct thinking (male reason) and sensuous imagination (female emotions), feminist criticism raises the suspicion that all modern products of reason, like progress and development, are not universally good for everyone (as usually pretended) but instead are masculine projects, conceived by masculine minds, that are particularly good for men. In this sense, development can be seen as the *problem* for women, not the solution. Critiques of Western science by feminist epistemologists that lay the basis for alternative ways of thinking could lead also to alternative ways of developing that favor women.

But the Third World feminist critique challenged this from the beginning, saying, essentially, “We are different from you in many ways don’t speak for us, and don’t tell us how to develop.” The postmodern feminist position on reason as colonizing scientific rationalism likewise finds development to be subtle Western coercion because it entraps women’s optimism about the future. Other, more ambivalent, partially postmodern positions would retain development yet completely rethink it. In doing so, feminists following Harroway suggest: do not think in the grand terms of a universal development model, and do not plan development from afar in Washington or New York (the god’s-eye view), but instead employ situated knowledges that listen to peoples varied experiences, particular circumstances, and varied needs and desires to construct “situated developments.” For us, such issues of great importance to development are implied by feminist epistemology.

Modernization required self-propelled men to leave the household, abandon tradition, and assume their place among other rational men. Women and the household were conceived as parts of the past, containing a dangerous worldview that nature was unalterable and people powerless to control it. So, modernization involved the subordination of tradition, nature, and the feminine. For Scott, theories of modernization also replicated the public–private dichotomy prominent in Western thought: the private sphere and females as inferior and derivative, or merely complementary to the favored public and male sphere. Scott also criticized dependency theory even that opposing modernization as representing the spread of capitalism and the intensification of exploitation. Scott argued that dependency, in its U.S. version especially, did not challenge the notion of an inherently dynamic and progressive capitalism that might end the pressing requirements of material necessity. As with Marx’s (early) notions about an unchanging Asia, dependency theorists saw pre capitalist social formations as obstructions to the realization of autonomous development in the peripheries.

Hence, dependency, Scott thought, shared modernization theory's dichotomous oppositions between the rational sphere of capitalist production and the private pre capitalist realm of family reproduction, this timed within a binary logic of center and periphery. Dependency theory portrayed industrialization of the public sphere as the paradigm for economic development, with stagnant pre capitalist social structures obstructing this kind of progress. Dependency theory shared with Marxism a definition of development as the mastery and transformation of nature. It too centered conceptualization of social struggles around productive activity, excluding struggles between men and women and retaining (however implicitly) notions of nature as feminine. Scott thought that both modernization and dependency theorists could learn from such a critical rereading of their ideas. Self-criticism could lead to a reconsideration of the meaning of modernity, industrialization, work, and development. Such a rereading allowed development theory to be placed within the crisis affecting Western social theory in the sense of questioning the rational subjects of theory, such masculinist dichotomies as modern and traditional, center and periphery, First and Third Worlds, and the role of theory in maintaining the essentialist categories that made dominance possible. Scott preferred feminist standpoint theory as her theoretical and political perspective. This preference made her sensitive to the ways in which systemic power structures lives. And it has possibilities for rewriting the meaning of development in terms of people's continuing efforts to realize their aspirations (Scott 1995).

II. WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

In response to such criticisms, feminists and development activists made a series of attempts at reformulating development theory. The basic issue was this: Given that women performed most of the labor in many, if not most, Third World societies, why had they been excluded from development theory, and what differences would it make if theory was reformulated to center around gender relations and women's experiences? Placing gender relations at the center of theorization, feminist development theorists argued, reorients developmental discourse toward different topics and interests. Traditional areas of developmental concern are seen from a different vantage point. Aspects of development previously relegated to the margins become, instead, the main foci of interest; for example, Third World industrialization employed not labor (assumed to be male) but women workers, while gender relations, previously subordinated to class considerations, became essential to understanding productive activity. As a consequence new aspects of development can be brought into focus for example, the informal and rural sectors of the economy, the reproductive sphere as a vital component of development, relations between production and reproduction, gender relations in export-oriented production, inequalities stemming from development, the

products of development (needs, not whims), with the thinker going all the way from conceptualization to experience.

To make this discussion a bit more concrete, we might consider rethinking development from specific feminist positions. For example, let us take the position of the feminist standpoint theory mentioned several times already and outlined in *Money, Sex and Power* by Nancy Hartsock (1985). In Hartsock's work, standpoint theory posits a series of levels of reality, with the deeper levels including and explaining the surfaces, or only appearances, of reality. Within this ontological position, feminist standpoint theory amplifies the liberatory possibilities embodied in women's experience. The feminist standpoint is related to the working-class standpoint (that is, Marxism theorizing on behalf of the exploited) but is more thoroughgoing, particularly because women do most of the work involved in reproducing labor power. For Hartsock, the male worker's contact with nature outside the factory is mediated by women, hence the female experience is deeper. Women's experience in reproduction represents a unity with nature that goes beyond the proletarian experience of material metabolic interchange. Motherhood results in the construction of female existence centered on a complex relational nexus and focused on the woman's body. By comparison, the man's experience is characterized by a duality of the concrete versus the abstract, deriving from the separation between household and public life. Such masculine dualism marks phallogocentric social theory, a system of hierarchical dualisms (abstract–concrete, mind–body, culture–nature, stasis–change, developed–underdeveloped, First World–Third World, etc.). A feminist standpoint, Hartsock thought, might be based in the commonalities within women's experiences, but this is not obvious, nor is it self-evident it needs reading out, developing, propagating. Hence, for Hartsock, women's life activity forms the basis of a specifically feminist materialism and, we might add, a specifically feminist development theory. Generalizing the human possibilities present in the life activity of women to the whole social system might raise for the first time in history “the possibility of a fully human community, a community structured by a variety of connections rather than separation and opposition” (Hartsock 1985: 247). Extending this insight, socialist feminists want to reformulate development in a way that combines, rather than separates, everyday life and the wider societal dimension, with productive activities of all kinds considered as a totality rather than split into hierarchical types (work–home), and with relations with nature placed at the heart of decisions on what and how much to produce. Thus, when it comes to feminist critical discussion of development, a variety of positions appears. Many feminist theorists of development think that the interaction between feminism and development has taken five main forms- Women in Development (WID); Women and Development (WAD); Gender and Development (GAD); Women, Environment, and Development (WED) (Rathgeber 1990; Young 1992; Visvanathan *et al.* 1997).

1. Women in Development

Perhaps the first important statement about the position of women in development was made by Esther Boserup, a Danish agricultural economist who had previously written a seminal text called *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth* (1965), which made the case that demographic pressure (population density) promotes innovation and higher productivity in the use of land (irrigation, weeding, crop intensification, better seeds) and labor (tools, better techniques). Boserup followed up her first book with *Women's Role in Economic Development* (1970), a critique of the idea that modernization, expressed as economic efficiency and modern planning, would emancipate women in the Third World. Boserup argued, to the contrary, that the modernization process, supervised by colonial authorities imbued with Western notions of the sexual division of labor, had placed new technologies under the control of men. This arrangement marginalized women (the main food producers in agricultural societies), reducing their status and undercutting their power and income. However, while modernization was not automatically progressive, Boserup thought that more enlightened policies by national governments and international agencies might correct these earlier mistakes. As Jane Jaquette (1990: 55) observed later: "Boserup's path-breaking work defined a new arena of policymaking and marked out a new area of professional expertise. The United States and other countries that are major donors of development assistance took steps to promote the integration of women into the development process." Boserup's revelations helped produce a new phenomenon, which was first termed "women in development," by the Women's Committee of the Washington, DC, chapter of the Society for International Development as part of a strategy calling attention to Third World women's situation (Rathgeber 1990: 490). In the United States, the Percy Amendment to the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act called for paying particular attention to projects that integrated women into the national economies of foreign countries, thereby improving their status and assisting in the development effort. An Office for Women in Development was established within USAID in 1974 (which was moved to the U.S. Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination in 1977). This office served as the nucleus for a network of researchers and practitioners in universities, research institutions (for example, the International Center for Research on Women, founded in Washington, DC, in 1976), and major foundations (the Ford Foundation chief, among them) interested in economic development. As part of this movement, the UN declared the years 1975–1985 to be the "United Nations Decade for Women." Moreover, as a result of pressure from feminist movements, virtually every development organization established programs to improve the economic and social position of women, the assumption usually being that women's problems stemmed from insufficient participation in what was otherwise assumed to be a benevolent process of economic growth. After the 1975

International Women's Year Conference in Mexico, the UN established UNIFEM (the United Nations Development Fund for Women) as a way of "reaching out to the poorest women in the world." When asked what they needed most, the predominant answer from women was income sufficient to provide for themselves and their children (Snyder 1995). The progressive, liberal idea was to increase women's participation and improve their share in resources, employment, and income in an attempt to effect dramatic improvements in living conditions. Essentially the key idea was to bring women full force into the development process (Mueller 1987). The WID position adopted by most of these formal state and governance institutions accepted the prevailing modernization theme of the time—that development is a linear process of economic growth and that differences between modern and traditional societies resulted from lack of sufficient contacts between them. The WID approach was to integrate women into existing development projects by addressing "women's issues" like maternal mortality and setting up women-only projects and organizations that addressed practical gender needs and interests (Moser 1993). During the late 1970s several studies documented facts about women's lives, such as the amount of unpaid labor women performed, while at the same time in-depth qualitative studies explored women's roles in local communities. One such study, prepared by the UN, documented the severity of gender inequality as follows: "As a group women . . . put in two thirds of the total number of working hours, they are registered as constituting one third of the total labour force and receive one tenth of the total remuneration. They own one percent of the world's material goods and their rights to ownership is often far less than those of men" (quoted in Pezzullo 1982: 15). Yet, during the United Nations decade devoted to women (1976–1985) their relative position actually worsened in terms of access to resources, work burdens, health, nutrition, and education! This lack of progress brought about the realization of the limited efficacy of an integrationist WID-type approach integrating women into a presumed progressive system and radicalized the study of Women and Development (WAD; Sen and Grown 1987). Formal meetings of the UN and other international organizations began to be disrupted by increasingly critical and feminist women. At the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, and at a "mid-decade" (relative to the UN's declarations) Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, fierce debates erupted over women's issues and the relevance of feminist theory. By the time of the 1985 Nairobi UN conference, Third World women, by then a clear majority of those attending, were defining the main issues, while most of the organizing and discussion occurred at alternative meetings held coincident with the official UN program. So, the Alternative Forum at Nairobi attracted 16,000 women to discuss women's conditions, the main themes being gender-based violence, the exclusion of women from control over vital resources, the feminization of poverty, and

the need for more radical approaches that questioned the very structures of existing societies. Feminism in development shifted from being primarily a Western women's concern to becoming a more heterogeneous movement, with an expanded definition reflecting greater involvement by organizations and movements from Third World countries. Caroline Moser (1993) has distinguished five variants within the WID school that reflect changes in the policies of the Western development agencies: (1) the "welfare approach" prior to 1970 focused on women's reproductive roles and related population issues, with programs initiated in such areas as birth control; Geeta Chowdry (1995) has argued that this approach illustrated WID's representation of Third World women as *zenana* (private, domestic world); (2) the "equity approach" reflected calls for equality coming from the UN Decade for Women—this met with considerable resistance from men; (3) the "antipoverty approach" focused on women entering the workforce, having access to income-generating activities, and joining the existing economic mainstream; Chowdry (1995) points out that, even so, women were still seen as occupying only the domestic private sphere, well removed from the political and economic affairs of society; (4) the "efficiency approach," which was aligned with IMF structural adjustment programs, stressed women's participation in restructured economies; and (5) the "empowerment approach" reflected Third World feminist writings, grassroots organizing, and women's need to transform laws and structures through a bottom-up approach. In all these approaches women were represented as victims. During the late 1970s and 1980s, the WID approach came under increasing criticism. Chowdry (1995: 26) argued that WID programs, as implemented by international development agencies, originated in two modernist discourses, the colonial discourse and the liberal discourse on markets. The colonial discourse, she thought, homogenized and essentialized Third World people by using the image of the "poor woman" (as an object of pity and remorse). The liberal discourse promoted free markets, voluntary choice, and individualism, themes that Chowdry found to be disempowering to Third World women. WID basically aligned itself with liberal feminism, although it used the poor woman image to evoke sympathy and obtain funds. Many of the WID practitioners were well educated liberal feminists, and the liberal feminist view of rationality and individual self-improvement prevailed in the approach. There was a representational emphasis in WID on "role models" or "outstanding women who have gained social recognition in the public sphere" to encourage "successful" female integration into the mainstream (Young 1993: 129). Thus, WID accepted the existing social and power structures, working within them to improve the position of women. Hence, the sexual division of labor was taken for granted as natural, without theorizing how women came to be oppressed by men. Ideological aspects of gender, unequal responsibilities between men and women, and the unequal value placed on men's and women's activities were all ignored.

As an ahistorical approach, WID did not consider influences on women such as class, race, or culture. WID's exclusive focus on women, and its avoidance of gender relations, made for shallow social and economic analysis.

WID avoided questioning women's subordination as part of a wider global system of capital accumulation. WID emphasized poverty and not oppression, and poverty was not seen as an outcome of male oppression over women. Hence, development strategies based on the WID position would be flawed, severely limited in their ability to bring about change. WID focused solely on the (formally) productive aspect of women's work, ignoring or dismissing reproductive activities. Mirroring modernization theory, development was seen as economic growth that could only occur in (formally) productive activities. This led to a partial analysis of women's roles and relations. For example, WID-supported activities provided income-generating opportunities for women, but there were no strategies for reducing the burden of their household tasks or improving reproductive technologies. WID adopted a non confrontational approach that sidestepped women's subordination and oppression. This emphasis on poverty also created a division between the demands of First World and Third World feminists as WID became involved with the needs of women "out there" in the developing world, while the feminist theorists remained part of Western culture—hence, a new kind of maternal, sorrowful gaze on the poor woman "Other." More generally, there was a neglect of questioning the whole assumption and goal of the dominant development paradigm of modernization theory (Rathgeber 1990; Young 1993). Postmodern feminist critics claimed that theorists and practitioners working in the WID school tended to represent Third World women conventionally as backward, vulnerable, and in need of help from the First World. Jane Parpart and Marianne Marchande (1995: 16) argued that the "WID discourse has generally fostered development practices that ignore difference(s), indigenous knowledge(s) and local expertise while legitimating foreign 'solutions' to women's problems in the South" all of this fits easily with U.S. aid policies. The outstanding poststructural critique of WID came from Adele Mueller (1987), using Foucault's (1980a) notions of the connections between power and knowledge, and Dorothy Smith's (1990a) ideas about the social construction of documentary reality. Mueller argued that the documentary procedures used by WID programs functioned to shift control over developmental issues from Third World settings to centralized development agency headquarters in Washington, Ottawa, and Geneva. In WID, development was defined as a technical problem requiring sophisticated methodologies available only in the First World. Accounts of Third World women were written in policy language amenable to the ongoing textual practices of development agencies. "Integrating women into development" basically involved WID professionals learning to speak bureaucratic policy language and teaching

textual practices to others. Mueller's (1987: 2) main critical finding was that "far from being a liberating force in the worldwide women's movement, Women in Development discourse is produced in and enters into the procedures of the Development institution in order to manage and otherwise rule the hierarchical divisions of the capitalist world order." These were damning criticisms. Yet, WID did not disappear as a result of these and many other theoretical, political, and practical inadequacies, for it is ensconced in structures of power far removed from academic or theoretical critique.

2. Women and Development

The WID approach argued that women should be brought into the modernization process. The WAD perspective argued that it was precisely their link with modernization that had impoverished them. As opposed to WID's modernization theory, WAD drew much more from dependency theory and neo-Marxist approaches to underdevelopment. Questions such as the origins of patriarchy, the intensification of patriarchy with the spread of capitalism, and Engels's (1972) analysis of the rise of private property, along with the agricultural revolution and the domestication of animals, formed the deep historical background to this school of thought (Bandarage 1984; Mies 1986). Rathgeber (1990) has pointed out that the WAD perspective focused on the social relations between men and women rather than Marxism's class relations. This view finds women always playing important roles in the economies of their societies as both productive and reproductive actors. It was precisely how women and their labor had been integrated into global capitalism by the core countries that explained marginalization and oppression as a contemporary example, women used as cheap labor for multinational corporations in export-processing zones (Visvanathan 1986, 1991, 1997). There has long been a socialist strain to the feminism that formed around WAD. However, the relationship often takes the form of a critique of Marxism. Socialist feminists pointed to deficiencies in classical Marxism that its analysis missed activities and relations fundamental to women's existence yet many also continued to admire the historical materialist form of understanding and shared Marxism's liberating intent. Socialist feminists have been particularly critical of classical Marxism's emphasis on the economy and its relative silence on the question of women (Mitchell 1966). An early feminist theorist, Heidi Hartmann (1981), argued that the analytical categories of Marxism were "sex-blind" in that the causes of gender inequality (male dominance over women) were lost during structural Marxist analyses of class inequality (ruling class domination over workers). A specifically feminist socialist analysis was needed to reveal the systematic character of gender inequalities. Yet, also, most feminist analyses were insufficiently materialist and historical for Hartmann. Hence, both "Marxist analysis, particularly its historical and materialist method, and feminist analysis,

especially the identification of patriarchy as a social and historical structure, must be drawn upon if we are to understand the development of western capitalist

societies and the predicament of women within them” (Hartmann 1981: 3). A main concern of socialist feminism involved retheorizing the significance of women’s work. Juliet Mitchell (1966), of Cambridge University, differentiated between the several structures affecting women’s condition production, reproduction, socialization, and sexuality—with the first involving women’s work in the non domestic economic sphere and the others concerning women as wives or mothers. Each structure had different contradictions and dynamics. But all formed a unity in women’s experience, with the family triptych of sexual, reproductive, and socializing functions dominant. Women performing domestic labor within the home and family created a different relation to the means of production than men. These activities fulfilled the function of the maintenance and reproduction of labor power in (contradictory) relation to production. Mariarosa Dalla Costa (1973) emphasized the quality of life and relations in domestic work as determining women’s place in society regardless of circumstances of place or class. Housewives were exploited workers, whose surplus was used most immediately by their husbands as an instrument of oppression—under capitalism, Dalla Costa said, women became the slaves of wages. In socialist feminism, as compared with Marxism, emphasis was replaced on the sexual division of labor or different types of social praxis (broadly interpreted) as the material experiential bases of physical and psychological differences between men and women. Women were constituted by the social relations they inhabited and the types of labor they performed. Beginning with the Marxist notion of production for the satisfaction of needs, socialist feminism argued that needs for bearing and raising children were as important as material needs (food, shelter) as well as needs of sexual satisfaction and emotional nurturing, all of which required (usually female) labor. Gender struggles over reproductive activity were fundamental, yet often ignored in traditional Marxist theory. Socialist feminist theories elaborated some of the implications of this basic position. Nancy Chodorow (1978), a sociologist at the University of California, Berkeley, argued for the social construction of masculinity and femininity within the family, especially in relations with the mother. Boys grew into achievement-oriented men adapted to work outside the home; girls grew into women adapted to emotional work inside or outside the home. Relations between economy, procreation, and male dominance were conceptualized by Ann Ferguson and Nancy Folbre’s (1981) notion of “sex-affective production,” the historically specific sets of activities that restricted women’s options and remuneration. Socialist feminists in general theorized procreative activities and public-sphere production as mutually interdependent, neither ultimately determining the other rather than the public determining the private. Public–private distinctions, socialist feminists thought,

rationalized the exploitation of women. In general the idea was that women performed unpaid labor in reproducing labor power as a kind of subsidy for capital, as well as working directly for capital as employees in factories or producers of commodities. Women were the super exploited working class. Second, however, some feminists still had problems with this kind of analysis. They thought that traditional Marxist analysis was simply pointed in the direction of women in a kind of “add women and stir” formula. They believed, instead, that new analytical categories like “patriarchy” were needed. Thus, Hartmann (1981: 14) defined patriarchy as a “set of social relations between men, which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish or create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women.” Patriarchy’s material base lay in men’s control over women’s labor power. Control was maintained by excluding women from access to essential productive resources. Here the analytical potential lay in connecting the social institutions that coerced and legitimized unequal power relations with the personal processes of psychology and consciousness through which people, especially women, accepted and rationalized their unequal positions in society. Significant advances were therefore made by socialist feminists in broadening the Marxian conception of the material reproduction of life. The equivalent socialist feminist theories of development stressed production and reproduction as inseparable aspects of the making of existence—and therefore equally significant parts of development theory. This broader conception of development included gender relations as well as class, women’s labor in the domestic and public spheres, child rearing and socialization, and the family as the particular locus of reproduction. For most of human history, productive and reproductive processes have occurred at the same time and in the same geographic location—as the barely distinguishable aspects of the social creation of a whole way of life. More recently and increasingly with “development,” the various aspects of the productive–reproductive whole separated into different social and spatial spheres. These spheres were bound together by relations of inequality and dominance. The entire surplus production system came to be underwritten by the unpaid labor of women. Sophisticated ideologies legitimized this exploitative system as natural. Development therefore was gender-determined as well as a class process. Indeed, gender and class intersected to form the specifics of the developmental process. Contradictions between parts of the life process have been a driving force in societal change. Indeed, socialist feminists find that class- and gender-dominated societies characterized by exploitation, dominance, and unequal life conditions regularly develop in biased, dangerous forms. Inequality produces catastrophe. Socialist feminists believe in entirely different forms of development predicated on transformed (egalitarian) gender relations. Socialist feminism remains committed to the Marxist notion of the historical and social creation of human nature in a process that

includes gender, race, ethnicity, and other distinctions as well as class. Socialist feminism calls for reproductive democracy, including collective participatory control over family and procreative decisions, as well as collective control over commodity production (Jagger 1983: 148–163). In this vein, the classical analysis of women in the international division of labor was presented by Maria Mies (1986). A German sociologist, Mies interpreted the historical development of the division of labor as a violent patriarchal process. By virtue of arms and warfare, a class of dominant men established an exploitative relationship with women, other classes, and other people. The rapid accumulation of wealth resulting from the globalization of exploitation produced a conception of progress in which satisfying the subsistence needs of the community appeared backward and outdated. This predatory patriarchal division of labor was based on the structural separation and subordination of men from women, local people from foreigners, that extended into the separation of men from nature. Science and technology became the main productive forces through which men could emancipate themselves— from nature and from women. The colonial division of labor, exchanging raw materials for industrial products to the detriment of colonial labor, was linked to the establishment of an internal colony composed of the nuclear family and “housewifized” women. Under the new international division of labor, formed by the partial industrialization of selected Third World countries since the 1970s, the use of docile, cheap female labor (housewives rather than workers) in the Third World was linked with the manipulation of women as consumers in the First World. Hence, for Mies a feminist liberation strategy had to be aimed at the total abolition of all these relations of retrogressive “progress.” Feminism called for the end of the exploitation of women and nature by men and the end of the exploitation of colonies and classes. By comparison, an approach that originated in the perspective of poor Third World women might reorient development analysis to critical aspects of resource use and abuse; to the importance of women’s labor in satisfying needs; to focusing attention on poverty and inequality; and to policies pointing to new possibilities for empowering women. The basic needs approach of agencies like the World Bank in the 1970s had involved loans for urban sites and services, social forestry, and the support of small farmers. But the basic-needs approach had adopted a methodology of commercialization and market integration, and in the context of inequality had led to exacerbation of the very problems that it was expected to solve. While development programs used a top-down approach to project identification, planning, and implementation, the real need, asserted Sen and Grown (1987: 40–41), was for policies oriented toward meeting people’s basic needs and drawing heavily on local participation. Moreover, the approach of “integrating women in development” used during the UN Decade for Women had basic flaws, not only because of the difficulties in overcoming ingrained cultural attitudes and

prejudices but because of the nature of the development programs into which women were to be integrated. “Short-term, ameliorative approaches to improve women’s employment opportunities are ineffective unless they are combined with long-term strategies to reestablish people’s especially women’s control over the economic decisions that shape their lives” (Sen and Grown 1987: 82). What was needed, suggested Sen and Grown, was a shift from export orientation to internal needs, reducing military expenditures, and controlling multinational corporations in other words, structural transformation rather than mere structural adjustments. Nevertheless, according to a critique by Eva Rathgeber (1990), WAD can be seen as neglecting social relations of gender within classes and not completely considering variations in patriarchy in different modes of production and how these impact women. The WAD approach emphasized, rather than patriarchy, women within international class structures of inequalities. When it came to the creation and implementation of development projects, critics claimed that WAD, like WID, tended to group women together without much notice being given to race, class, or ethnicity (though Sen and Grown’s analysis is clearly an exception to this criticism). There was also the difficulty of changing fundamental structures (structural transformation). Kabeer (1994) argued that Marxists and dependency feminists took uncompromising (revolutionary) stands that prevented them from undertaking realistic, effective changes. Furthermore, poststructural critics saw analyses such as Sen and Grown’s (1987) as universalizing the Western sexual division of labor and employing categories like “labor” and “production” rooted in the culture of capitalist modernity that were inadequate for describing “other” societies. Such concepts were abstracted from the historical experience of the European man, who repressed not just women but also “other” people (although this criticism seems to neglect the Third World woman’s perspective adopted by Sen and Grown). Feminists using the Marxist paradigm had not overcome its limitations. Extending this paradigm repressed, distorted, and obscured many aspects of women’s existence. Additionally, Sen and Grown were said to represent poor Third World women as too much in the thrall of feminism’s own narcissistic self-image. Instead of patronizing “poor Third World women,” we were best advised to learn from them, which meant appreciating the immense heterogeneity of the field. Poststructural critics also believed that First World feminists should learn to stop feeling privileged as women (Spivak 1988: 135–136). In this light, Sen and Grown’s “alternative visions” were said to be mired in androcentric Western thinking in that they failed to provide a genuine alternative to mainstream development (Hirschman 1995).

3. Gender and Development

The origins of the GAD perspective lie with women working in the mid-1970s at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex (U.K.). This feminist group was interested in

analyzing women's subordination within the development process from the vantage point of gender relations between men and women; initially it drew on Marxist analyses of social change and feminist analyses of patriarchy (Young 1993: 134). GAD differed from WID in its conceptualization of the sexual division of labor. Whereas WID tended to accept the sexual division of labor as allocating tasks between men and women, hence arguing that more value needed to be placed on the tasks done by women, GAD argued that the sexual division of labor in a society was one of connection in which men and women became dependent on each other and that therefore the allocation of tasks should be changed. DAWN's work also contributed greatly to the gender and development approach (Chowdry 1995; Rathgeber 1990). In the GAD approach, gender relations rather than "women" became the main analytical category, while also a number of assumptions ignored by WID and WAD were explored in greater depth. For example, GAD argued that women were not a homogenous group but rather were divided by class, race, and creed. Women's roles in society could not be seen as autonomous from gender relations, and this perspective became a way of looking at the structures and processes giving rise to women's disadvantaged position, which was a function too of the globally pervasive ideology of male superiority—men had power and control over women. Young (1993: 134–135) notes that GAD was an holistic approach in which culturally specific forms of inequality and divisions occurred, and gender became interrelated with this overall socially created hierarchy. Consequently, gender had to be acknowledged as part of a wider international system. For example, capitalism used gender relations to produce a reserve of labor, while women's unpaid labor in the household was a way of creating wealth for global corporations. Unlike WID and WAD, GAD saw the state as an important actor promoting women's emancipation. Rathgeber (1990) has argued that GAD went further than WID or WAD in questioning underlying social, economic, and political structures, which made its recommendations difficult to implement since structural change was found to be imperative. However, Kabeer (1994) argued that GAD also opened new strategies for feminist intervention: GAD's multifarious approach distinguished between capitalism, patriarchy, and racism and also enabled feminists to identify key weak links in official policies for strategic interventions. While some saw these strategies as necessary for feminists to respond to the needs of poor women (Visvanathan, Duggan, Nissonoff, and Wiegersma 1997: 24), others argued that GAD did not get rid of its modernist tendencies while still essentializing poor women. This focus on image and discourse resulted from the influence of post structural and postmodern ideas on the gender debate. But before we discuss postmodernism, we turn to an important offshoot of the WAD and GAD approaches that focuses more on relations among women, development, and the natural environment.

4. Women, Environment, and Development

This perspective also began in the 1970s as feminists increasingly drew parallels between men's control over women and male control over nature, with connections made among masculine science and industrialization and assaults on the ecological health of the planet. Carolyn Merchant (1980) saw the roots of the world's environmental dilemma as emanating from the worldview developed by the founding fathers of modern science, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Isaac Newton, in which reality was thought of as a machine rather than a living organism. She saw the acceleration of the exploitation of human and natural resources in the name of culture and progress resulting in the death of nature as a living being. Similarly, ecofeminists interested in the contemporary Third World, such as Vandana Shiva and Maria Mies, adopted a radical feminist perspective on the exploitation of nature. Shiva argued that science and development were not universal categories but rather special projects of Western patriarchy that were killing nature (Shiva 1989). Development in the Third World superimposed the scientific and economic paradigms created by Western gender-based ideology on communities previously immersed in other cultures with entirely different relations with the natural world. As victims of the violence of patriarchal development, women resisted this "development" to protect nature and preserve their own sustenance. Thus, ecological struggles simultaneously liberated nature from ceaseless exploitation and women from limitless marginalization. In an analysis of the effects of the green revolution in the Punjab region, on India's border with Pakistan, Shiva argued that the assumption of nature as a source of scarcity, with technology as the source of abundance, created ecological and cultural disruptions that ended in diseased soil, pest-infested crops, waterlogged deserts, discontented farmers, and unprecedented levels of conflict and violence. For Diane Rocheleau, Barbara Thomas-Slayter, and Esther Wangari (1996), there were real gender differences in experiences of nature and a responsibility for the environment deriving not from biology but from social constructions of gender that varied with class, race, and place. They saw feminist scholarship on the environment taking a number of forms. Some schools of thought, such as socialist feminism, disagreed with biologically based portrayals of women as nurturer, and saw women and the environment more in terms of reproductive and productive roles in unevenly developing economies. For example, Bina Agarwal (1991) argued that women in India have been active not because of some "natural" relation with the environment (as with Shiva) but because they suffered more in gender-specific ways from environmental destruction. Feminists thus drew from cultural and political ecology's emphasis on unequal control over resources (Peet and Watts 1996) but treated gender as a critical variable in interaction with class, race, and other factors shaping processes of ecological change. Three themes were pursued in feminist political ecology: gendered knowledge,

reflecting an emerging science of survival in healthy homes, workplaces, and ecosystems; gendered environmental rights, including property, resources, and space; and gendered environmental politics, particularly women's involvement in collective struggles over natural resources and environmental issues (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayter, and Wangari 1996). The notion of "sustainable development" became central to the WED perspective. This notion linked ideas of equity between generations, the balance between economic and environmental needs to conserve nonrenewable resources, and the idea of reducing industrialization's waste and pollution. Sustainable development was seen as an opportunity for challenging the development-equals-economic-growth equation from the perspective of a feminist methodology. This meant differentiating feminism even from other alternative notions of economics and development. Thus, according to Wendy Harcourt (1994b), an alternative "real-life economics" (Ekins and Max-Neef 1992) arose that wanted to expand the notion of development to consider environmental degradation, poverty, and participation, yet still needed demystifying to disclose its sexism. In this perspective, economics in the form of mathematical models was reductionist and inadequate for expressing the ambiguities and contradictions in complex processes. For feminists, the historical replacement of *techné* by episteme in the West and the contemporary process of replacement in the Third World undervalued women's nurturing and sustaining of the environment. Western development economics, with its devaluation of nature and failure to treat other cultures with dignity, can well afford to learn from other modes of social organization rather than always assuming its superiority (Harcourt 1994b).

DEVELOPEMNT IN THE POST MODERN PERSPECTIVE

The Postmodernism and Development perspective asked whether a more accessible and politicized postmodern feminism had relevance for the problems facing women in Third World societies (Marchand and Parpart 1995). The PAD perspective criticized the GAD view as representing Third World women as "other" or, in the case of WID, using images of women as victims, sex objects, and cloistered beings. Postmodern feminists found the WID view embedded in colonial/neocolonial discourse and enshrined in the liberal discourse on markets, both of which disempowered women. Particularly appealing for PAD theorists was postmodernism's emphasis on differences, providing space for the voices of the marginalized (Hooks 1984), and disrupting the representation of women in the South as an undifferentiated "other" (Mohanty 1991a). Also the postmodern critique of the subject and its suspicion of the "truth" suggested an alliance between postmodernism and feminism based on a common critique of the modernist episteme. Postmodern critics questioned the certainty of Eurocentric development studies and criticized the silencing of local knowledges

by Western expertise—all this they found relevant to the development of women. Some of the themes arising from the encounter between feminism, postmodernism, and development included a critique of colonial and contemporary constructions of the “Third World” woman what Apffel-Marglin and Simon (1994) call “feminist orientalism”; deconstruction of development discourses that disempowered poor women in particular; the recovery of women’s knowledge and voices; the celebration of differences and multiple identities; and a focus on consultative dialogue between development practitioners and their “clients.” A good example was Jane Parpart’s (1995) deconstruction of the development “expert” as a person with special technical knowledge of the modern world who can solve the problems of the developing countries. The notion of “expertise” underlying this privileged position, Parpart argued, is embedded in Western Enlightenment thought with its specialization of knowledge for example, development economics as the “science of economic progress.” Yet, many also recognized that postmodern feminism, taken to extremes, could stymie collective action among women and that the impenetrable jargon of postmodern writing was an unsurmountable obstacle for people mired in illiteracy and economic crisis (Parpart and Marchand 1995). Rather than rejecting development altogether, most postmodern feminists in this field recognized the real problems faced by poor women and the need for addressing development issues. They favored an approach “that accepts and understands difference and the power of discourse, and that fosters open, consultative dialogue that can empower women in the South to articulate their own needs and agendas” (Parpart and Marchand 1995: 19). Development as a conscious practice, as a set of policies, alters gender relations in favor of men, shifting resources to the male sphere of control and making women more vulnerable to disasters, whether natural or social in origin. As feminist scholarship deepened, understanding the causes of these problems ranged from considering deficiencies in the distribution of material benefits, to exploring inequalities in control over productive resources, to confronting criticisms of the androcentrism of the founding Western cultural ideas about science and values. Carolyn Merchant (1980: 11) observes that feminist history turns society upside down, and at first sight feminist critiques of development appear to view the world in reverse, seeing the normal as abnormal, the praiseworthy as abhorrent, and the apparently just as unjust. In this sense, criticism from the feminist perspective tends to reverse the dominant trend, move in support of the antithesis, and see things as opposites. So, a feminist inspired “development policy” (if that is not a contradiction in terms) would see productive labor as reproductive work. Theoretical viewpoints derive from thinking about the experiences of particular groups of people, and these histories are far more than Western feminist reactions to male domination in the West. As feminist thought changes under the constant pressure of critique and counter critique, attempts are increasingly made

to recognize, and even identify with, the quite different experiences of a world of diverse people (especially different groups of women), from experiences which, while comparable in some respects, are incomparable in many others. This incomparability means that Western women theorists cannot just reverse Western male-centeredness but rather must invent new things. More importantly, Western women's reversals are but one tradition in feminist critical thought. There is a world of different experiences waiting to be recognized, drawn upon, criticized, but also appreciated. Likewise, interventions into the development process take many forms, some of which are not only incomparable but even in opposition, one to the other, so that "global feminism" is at best a network of tolerance and at worst a barely contained squabble. This state of affairs means that "development" even as reproduction-centered improvements may take so many forms that continuity or similarity of project becomes difficult and, for some, impossible. Even the words "project" or "improvement" imply, for adherents of the PAD perspective, immersion in Western thinking, a capturing of the imagination by Western themes of progress. We find the criticisms of WAD overdrawn and would like this discourse to return to the agenda set forth by Sen and Grown (1987), namely, breaking down the structures that foster inequalities, reorienting production to meet the needs of the poor, combining immediate improvements with long-term strategies that establish women's control over their own decision themes that we raise again in our concluding chapter, which derives from a feminist socialism. However, reading the recent literature on feminism and development, we could not help but notice the tentativeness of the ideas expressed, the tendency to repeat a few well-established themes, and the incomplete character of the conclusions that were offered. Virtually the entire discourse on women and development consists of collections of essays, most of which are case studies exemplifying general themes whose particulars are scarcely, or never, explicitly stated, so the knowledge produced is fragmentary and inconclusive. This is particularly so in coming up with concrete proposals for change studies that cry out for proposed solutions in desperate straits suddenly end. We think that feminism is far too fractured, far too reluctant to "speak for others," too hesitant to make overarching generalizations, and too much involved in "strategy" rather than fundamental transformative politics. For us, this apparent "failure of nerve" derives from an overreaction to the criticisms presented of the early feminist ideas from Third World women. It is time to get over it! Feminist thought, taken to the extreme, involves restructuring the imagination to think in entirely new ways. We think that feminists, regardless of nationality and class identity, need to speak on behalf of poor women everywhere. Alternative feminist conceptions about development are difficult, but not impossible, to create. It is time to raise again the fundamental issues involved in real socialist feminist alternatives. We think feminist development theorists need to regain their nerve and begin

developing far more coherent arguments that advocate for others and have revolutionary implications.

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